Directorate of Intelligence

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
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Terrorism Review

3.5(c)

7 July 1983

GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983




3.5(c) Terrorism Review 3.5(c) 7 July 1983 NR 23 Argentina: Status of the Monteneros 3.5(c). (ALA) NR





































Argentina: Status of the Montoneros

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J(C)	several dozen leftist Montonero guerrillas have reentered the country and may be planning to resume	scheduled for next January. The security forces are parently recognize these constraints and)-
	military activities. Well-publicized incidents—inter- ruptions of television broadcasts by Montonero propa- ganda speeches, discovery of weapons caches, and other crimes for which the terrorists reportedly have	do not expect any signicant actions by the Montoneros until well after the military leaves power. 3.5(c)	fi- e 3.3(
(b)(1)	claimed responsibility—have reinforced concerns.	For now and probably beyond elections in October the Montoneros are likely to focus on political action they	
ō(c)	early April, the police have captured some 10 Montoneros, and the press reports that police have killed several leaders in firefights.	continue to work through organized labor and left political parties. The extreme left wing of the predefinant Peronist Party appears to be especially open Montonero influence. Its leader, Vicente Saadi,	om-
	The deaths of the Montonero leaders—one of whom was reportedly found with weapons, funds, and plans for further subversive activity—have been used by regime officials to bolster the position of the security services against civilian critics who have called for an end to the military's role in internal security matters. Regime leaders, for example, followed up the most recent shootout with a highly publicized report that detailed the history of Montonero terrorist activity. They also privately briefed leading politicians on the ongoing terrorist threat. Although there is growing evidence that the shootings may have been staged executions, the report and briefings have thus far helped dissipate criticism by most moderate politicians; all but the harshest regime critics have publicly acknowledged the need for continued efforts to com-	backer of the Montoneros and receives a monthly stipend from funds kept in Mexico. In addition, his newspaper, La Voz, was started about two years as with Montonero capital and has become an import vehicle for the organization's propaganda. Should the Montoneros decide to renew terrorist activity, moral support would remain strong amons some Latin American leftists, but we judge that material assistance, if forthcoming, would be limit The Mexicans and Bolivians, for example, while willing to provide a safehaven, would not supply the Montoneros with weapons and would probably blosignificant arms buys and military activity within	s go ant 3.
(c)	In our view, the Montoneros are unlikely to mount more than small-scale operations over the coming months. The security forces continue to successfully penetrate their organization abroad and apparently have had little difficulty in ferreting out what little remains of the terrorist network in Argentina. In addition to the high personal risk of renewed terrorist actions, the Montoneros may calculate that more intense activities could prompt a military crackdown, posing a threat to the transition to civilian rule,	their borders. The Cubans, har renewed their commitment to the terrorists after a year's respite. Havana, however, is already spread thin and, considering the high political costs and lo likelihood of success, is unlikely to furnish more the shelter, training, some financial assistance, and cover propaganda support; Nicaragua would probably follow a similar policy. Outside Latin America, the Play would probably continue to provide training and political support. 3.5(c)	ow an ert l-
	23	Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983	



